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Scientific research on consciousness is attempting to gather data about 
the relationship between consciousness and the physical world. The basic 
procedure is to measure consciousness through first-person reports, measure the 
physical world and look for correlations between these sets of measurements. 
While most of this work has focused on neural correlates of consciousness, it 
has also been proposed that consciousness is linked to the computations that 
are being executed by the brain. If this is the case, we would expect there to 
be a high level of correlation between some of the brain’s computations and 
consciousness. This could be scientifically tested if a plausible method for 
measuring computations could be found.
This paper investigates whether Chalmers’ method for identifying 
computations could be used to measure computations during an experiment 
on the correlates of consciousness. A number of arguments are used to show 
that Chalmers’ account of implementation fails for a desktop computer, which 
makes it unlikely that it could be used to identify computational correlates of 
consciousness in the brain. While a different account of implementation might 
be able to rescue computational approaches to consciousness, the problems 
raised in this paper suggest that it is going to be difficult to develop a method 
for measuring computations that could be used to test whether there are 
computational correlates of consciousness in the brain.
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1. Introduction
Consciousness is a significant research topic in philosophy and a variety 
of theories and elaborate thought experiments have been put forward. 
However, although a great deal of effort has been expended, it can be 
argued that our understanding of consciousness has failed to advance 
much beyond Descartes. The situation has changed in recent years with 
the emergence of the scientific study of consciousness. This aims to gather 
data about correlations between consciousness and the physical world 
while suspending judgement about the metaphysics and philosophical 
debates. Scientific data about the correlates of consciousness could help us 
to improve our philosophical theories about consciousness and it has many 
practical applications - for example, it could help us to answer questions 
about the consciousness of brain-damaged patients, infants and animals.
In an experiment on the correlates of consciousness, the general 
procedure is to measure consciousness, measure the physical world and 
look for a relationship between these measurements. The measurement of 
consciousness relies on the working assumption that consciousness is a real 
phenomenon that can be reported verbally (“I see a red hat”, “I taste stale 
milk”) or through other behaviour, such as pushing a button, pulling a lever, 
short term memory (Koch 2004) or the Glasgow Coma scale (Teasdale and 
Jennett 1974). The assumption that consciousness can be measured through 
behaviour enables us to obtain data about it without a precise definition. 
However, this reliance on external behaviour limits consciousness 
experiments to systems that are commonly agreed to be conscious, such 
as a human or a human-like animal. It is not possible to carry out this 
type of experiment on non-biological systems, such as computers, because 
a computer’s reports are not generally regarded as a measurement of 
consciousness (Gamez 2012). 
The physical world is measured to identify spatiotemporal structures that 
might be correlated with the measurements of consciousness. In this paper I 
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am focusing on the correlates of consciousness in the human brain,1 which 
will be defined in a similar way to Chalmers’ (2000) definition of the total 
correlates of consciousness: 
D1. A correlate of a conscious experience, e1, is a minimal set of one or 
more spatiotemporal structures in the human brain. This set is present 
when e1 is present and absent when e1 is absent. This will be referred to 
as a CC set.2
Correlates defined according to D1 would continue to be associated with 
consciousness if they were extracted from the brain or implemented in an 
artificial system. ‘Spatiotemporal structures’ is a deliberately vague term 
that captures anything that might be correlated with consciousness, such 
as activity in brain areas, functions, neural synchronization, computations, 
information patterns, electromagnetic waves, quantum events, etc. 
In an experiment on the correlates of consciousness a contrastive 
methodology is typically used that compares the state of the brain when 
it is conscious and unconscious, or compares conscious and unconscious 
states within a single conscious brain - for example, using binocular rivalry 
(Logothetis 1998) or through the subliminal presentation of stimuli (Dehaene 
et al. 2001).3 Systematic experiments are needed to test all possible 
combinations of spatiotemporal structures that might form CC sets (see 
Table 1). When one or more CC sets have been identified they can be used 
to make predictions about the level and contents of consciousness, which 
can be compared with first person reports.
While most scientists have focused on the neural correlates of 
1 I am focusing on the human brain because we are confident that it is linked 
to conscious states. Once we have identified the correlates of consciousness in the 
human brain we can use them to make predictions about the consciousness of other 
systems (Gamez 2012).
2 In D1 CC sets are linked with individual conscious experiences. To improve 
the readability of the text I will often talk about the correlates of consciousness in 
general, which can be considered to be the complete set of CC sets.
3 Reviews of some of this experimental work are given by Rees et al. (2002), 
Tononi and Koch (2008) and Dehaene and Changeux (2011).
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consciousness, there are several different types of spatiotemporal structure 
in the brain that could form CC sets. For example:
•  Physical correlates. The correlate of consciousness is a spatiotemporal 
pattern in one specific aspect of the brain, such as neuron activity, 
electromagnetic waves or quantum states. In this case the CC set 
consists of the spatiotemporal pattern and the substrate in which 
the pattern is instantiated - the pattern would not be correlated with 
Table 1. Illustrative example of correlations that could exist between conscious 
experiences (e1 and e2) and a physical system. It is assumed that e1 and e2 can 
occur at the same time. A, B, C and D are spatiotemporal structures in the physical 
system, such as dopamine, neural synchronization or 40Hz electromagnetic waves. 
A, B, C and D are assumed to be the only possible features of the system. ‘1’ 
indicates that a feature is present; ‘0’ indicates that it is absent. In this example 
D is not a correlate of consciousness because it does not systematically co-vary 
with either of the conscious states. {A,B} is a set of spatiotemporal structures that 
correlates with conscious experience e1. {C} is a set of spatiotemporal structures 
that correlates with conscious experience e2.
Spatiotemporal Structures Conscious Experiences
A
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
B
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
C
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
D
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
e1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
e2
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
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consciousness if it was present in a different physical substrate. For 
example, it has been suggested that some neural synchronization 
patterns might form CC sets. If this is a physical correlate, then the 
same synchronization patterns between oscillating electronic circuits 
would not be correlated with consciousness.
•  Informational correlates. Tononi (2004; 2008) has suggested that 
the integration and differentiation of the brain’s information states, 
known as ‘information integration’, is identical with consciousness. 
The material in which the information integration is instantiated is not 
relevant to this theory. If this is correct, there should be a high level 
of correlation between information integration and consciousness and 
information integration would form a CC set by itself.4
•  Computational correlates. It has been proposed that the mind can 
be understood in computational terms or that consciousness is 
identical with some of the brain’s computations (Cleeremans 2005). 
If this is the case, we would expect there to be a correlation between 
consciousness and the execution of particular computations, and this 
should be independent of the substrate or mechanism by which the 
computations are executing. This putative link between computations 
and consciousness is the main focus of this paper and it can be stated 
as the following hypothesis:
H1: There is at least one computation, Cc , that is a sole member of a 
CC set.5 The architecture and material of the physical system that Cc is 
executed on are not part of this CC set and have no effect on whether 
Cc is correlated with consciousness.
If H1 is correct, it will be possible to create artificial consciousness 
by running a computer program. We could also create a copy of our 
4 Some of the difficulties with experiments on information integration and 
consciousness (Gamez 2014) also apply to experiments on the computational 
correlates of consciousness.
5 A real world program or computation can be decomposed into collections of 
subroutines, calls to external libraries and the operating system, etc. In H1 all of 
these computations are considered to be the single computation, Cc.
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consciousness by running a program that simulates our brain at an 
appropriate level of detail. The consciousness associated with these 
programs would be the same regardless of whether they are running on a 
modern desktop computer or on Babbage’s Analytical Engine.
This paper examines whether H1 could be scientifically tested using 
the same methodology as an experiment on the neural correlates of 
consciousness. This could be done by measuring the computations in the 
conscious brain, measuring the computations in the unconscious brain and 
looking for computations that are only present in the conscious brain.6 
The difficulty with this type of experiment is that very few methods for 
measuring computations in physical systems have been put forward. 
Modern digital computers execute programs and convert input strings 
into output strings, and it might be thought that we could identify 
computations in other physical systems by looking for executing programs 
or string processing (Piccinini 2007). The limitation of this approach is that 
it is unlikely to be applicable to the brain, since it is far from obvious that 
the brain’s operations are based on programs or string processing. If we 
want to test the hypothesis that the brain contains computational correlates 
of consciousness, we will have to find a more general way of measuring 
computations that can be applied to a wide range of physical systems. 
A second way of measuring computations in a physical system is to map 
the computation onto a finite state automaton (FSA) and determine whether 
the sequence of states of the FSA over a particular execution run with a 
particular input pattern matches the sequence of states of the target system. 
FSAs are often used to specify programs’ state transitions and they can be 
used to identify computations in a wide range of systems, including the 
brain. The problem with FSAs is that a disjunctive mapping can be used to 
interpret a sequence of unique states in any physical system as the execution 
of a program, which leads to an untenable panpsychism (Putnam 1988; 
Bishop 2002; Bishop 2009). While the FSA mapping issues are disputed 
(Chrisley 1995; Chalmers 1996), it is likely that this approach is too liberal 
6 To prove that computations are sole members of CC sets it will also be 
necessary to demonstrate that the substrate or mechanism by which the computation 
is being executed is irrelevant. A discussion of this issue is given in Gamez (2012).
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in its attribution of computations to physical systems. To make this clearer, 
suppose that we carry out an experiment on the correlates of consciousness 
and identify a FSA, FSA1, in the conscious brain. If Putnam (1988) and 
Bishop (2002; 2009) are right, FSA1 can be found in any sufficiently 
complex set of state transitions, and so we will be able to find it in the state 
transitions of the unconscious brain. If FSA1 is present in the conscious and 
unconscious brain, it cannot be a correlate of consciousness. Experiments 
on the computational correlates of consciousness need an implementation 
method that is less liberal than FSAs.
The most promising method that I am aware of for identifying 
computations in physical systems is the combinatorial state automata (CSA) 
approach put forward by Chalmers (1996; 2011), which can be roughly 
summarized as follows:
1)  A causal topology is an abstract causal organization, a pattern of 
causal interactions among a set of elements that is independent of 
any particular implementation.
2)  Organizationally invariant properties of a system only depend on its 
causal topology. 
3)  When a system implements a particular causal topology it 
implements the organizationally invariant properties associated with 
that causal topology.
4) Mental properties are organizationally invariant properties.
5)  Instead of FSAs, which have a monadic state, Chalmers uses a 
combinatorial state automaton (CSA) to specify a causal topology. 
Each CSA state consists of a vector of substates that can have a finite 
number of possible values.
6)  A CSA is claimed to be an adequate way of specifying a causal 
topology.
7)  To determine whether a physical system implements a particular 
CSA, the CSA substates are typically mapped onto distinct regions 
of the physical system. If the system implements the CSA, then 
the causal interactions between these regions will lead to the state 
transitions specified in the CSA.
8)  Any system that  implements  a  par t icular  CSA has the 
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organizationally invariant properties that are associated with the 
causal topology specified by the CSA.
CSAs are related to FSAs, but more restricted in the systems that they apply 
to. This might enable them to identify computations in the conscious brain 
that are not present in the unconscious brain. CSAs are also more general 
than accounts of implementation based on modern digital computers. While 
many criticisms have been made of Chalmers’ account of implementation 
(Scheutz 2001; Miłkowski 2011; Ritchie 2011; Brown 2012; Egan 2012; 
Harnad 2012; Klein 2012; Rescorla 2012; Scheutz 2012; Shagrir 2012; 
Sprevak 2012), it is far from clear what could be used to replace it if it was 
found to be seriously flawed (see Section 4). 
Chalmers’ account of implementation enables us to replace the general 
hypothesis that there are computational correlates of consciousness (H1) 
with a more concrete hypothesis that could potentially be tested:
H2: There is at least one CSA, CSAc, that is a sole member of a CC 
set. The architecture and material of the physical system that CSAc is 
executed on are not part of this CC set and have no effect on whether 
CSAc is correlated with consciousness.
We can test H2 by measuring consciousness through first person reports, 
measuring CSAs in the brain (see Section 3.1) and looking for correlations 
between these two sets of measurements. This type of experiment must 
meet at least two requirements:
R1: There must be an objective fact of the matter about which CSAs 
are being executed by a physical system. If consciousness is correlated 
with the execution of a CSA in a physical system, then it must be 
possible to identify CSAs in a non-ambiguous objective way. Otherwise 
the results of an experiment on the correlates of consciousness will 
depend on the subjective interpretation of the experimenter.
R2: A CSA that is a sole member of a CC set cannot be executed when 
the system is unconscious. A CSA that is executed both when a system 
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is conscious and unconscious cannot be sufficient for consciousness by 
itself - other things must be necessary as well.
This paper will examine whether the potential correlation between CSAs 
and consciousness could be experimentally tested in a way that is consistent 
with these requirements. To make the issues clearer I will focus on a simple 
test system, a desktop computer running a robot control program, which is 
described in Section 2. If Chalmers’ method could successfully identify the 
computations in this test system, then we would have grounds for believing 
that it could be used to identify computations in the brain. Section 3 raises 
a number of problems that occur when we try to use Chalmers’ method to 
identify computations in the test system in a way that is consistent with R1 
and R2. These suggest that a CSA-based account of implementation cannot 
be used to identify computational correlates of consciousness in the brain. 
The discussion in Section 4 considers whether the problems with Chalmers’ 
approach could be addressed by developing a better way of measuring 
computations in physical systems.
2. Test System
2.1 Introduction
Before Chalmers’ CSA-based account of implementation is applied to 
the brain it is advisable to check that it is a good way of identifying 
computations in a much simpler physical system. This can be done by 
applying Chalmers’ approach to a basic test system that has known 
computations. If the result matches the computations that we expect to be 
executing in the test system and is consistent with R1 and R2, then the same 
approach could potentially be used to identify computational correlates of 
consciousness in the brain.
The test system that I have selected for this purpose is a standard desktop 
computer running a robot control program. Since this is a paradigmatically 
computational system, we would expect that the CSA corresponding to the 
running program will be easy to identify using Chalmers’ method. The use 
of a paradigmatically computational system as a test system also avoids 
contentious discussions about whether arbitrary physical systems, such 
158   David Gamez
as walls, rocks or buckets of water, can be said to implement a particular 
computation (Searle 1990; Copeland 1996). Most people would agree that a 
desktop computer running a particular program is a computational system 
and that it is implementing the computations listed in the program. A third 
reason for choosing this test system is that our theories of mind are often 
influenced by our beliefs about how computers work. These theories could 
be clarified and improved by developing a better understanding of the 
relationship between a physical computer, the programs running on the 
computer and the computations that the computer is executing. 
The test system is presented in detail to support the discussion and to 
enable other people to suggest how it could be analyzed for computational 
correlates of consciousness. Although it is not capable of any of the 
functions that have been proposed to be linked to consciousness (for 
instance, the implementation of a global workspace (Baars 1988)), the 
issues raised in this paper are applicable to any program that could run on 
a computer. No claim is being made about whether or not the test system 
is actually conscious –it is just being used to illustrate how computations 
could be identified in a way that is consistent with the requirements of an 
experiment on the correlates of consciousness (R1 and R2).7
2.2 Desktop Computer, P1 and the Simple Robot
The test system is a standard desktop computer that controls a simple two 
wheeled robot (see Figure 1). I have chosen a robotic system to address 
claims that embodiment is necessary for cognition and/or consciousness. 
The robot has a light sensor on top, and the motors driving the wheels 
can be independently controlled. This system is detailed enough to enable 
questions about the physical implementation of computations to be 
accurately posed, but hopefully simple enough so that the discussion does 
not get bogged down in details about drivers and internal communications. 
The code for the control program, P1, is as follows:
1. lightSensor = 0;
2. oldLightSensor = 0;
7 Also requirement R3, which is set out in Section 3.1.
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3. motivation = 2;
4. leftWheel = 1;
5. rightWheel = 1;
6.  
7. while(true){
8.    lightSensor = getSensorReading();
9. 
10.   if(lightSensor == oldLightSensor){
11.      if(motivation > 0)
12.         motivation = motivation - 1;
13.   }
14.   else{
15.      motivation = 2;
16.      oldLightSensor = lightSensor;
17.   }
18.
19.   if(motivation > 0){
20.      leftWheel = 1;
21.      rightWheel = 1;
22.   }
23.   else{
24.      leftWheel = 1;
Figure 1. Wheeled robot
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25.      rightWheel = 0;
26.   }
27.
28.    updateMotors(leftWheel, rightWheel);
29. }
P1 runs as a single thread. The getSensorReading() function returns 1 if 
the light reading of the sensor is above a threshold, or 0 if it is below the 
threshold. The oldLightSensor variable stores the previous state of the light 
sensor and the motivation variable is decreased if the light does not change 
between cycles of the while loop. The updateMotors() function sets the 
state of the motors, using a device driver to communicate with the robot’s 
hardware. Each motor runs when its variable is set to 1; the motors are off 
when their variables are set to 0. 
Under the control of this program the robot will move forward in a 
straight line when the light is changing, or circle if the light stays the same. 
A stroboscope with double the while loop’s frequency will be required to 
drive the robot forward. The robot would exhibit smoother behaviour if the 
getSensorReading() function returned a wider range of values. The robot 
would then move forward in response to a gradual increase or decrease in 
light level. I omitted this feature because it would substantially increase the 
size of the CSA without significantly altering the example. 
2.3 CSA1
The CSA description of the program, CSA1, is illustrated in Figure 2. A first 
point to note about the mapping from P1 to CSA1 is that a state can make 
different transitions depending on where it occurs in the program. Suppose 
that the program variables are represented as the vector [ls, ols, m, lw, 
rw] and the call to the getSensorReading() function puts the system into 
state [1,1,1,1,1]. At line 10 of the program this state will lead to [1,1,0,1,1] 
followed by [1,1,0,1,0]. However, if the system is in state [1,1,1,1,1] at line 
19 of the program, then it will stay in this state until getSensorReading() is 
called, which could leave the state as it is or cause it to transition to [0,1,1,1,1]. 
To take this into account in the mapping of P1 onto CSA1 we need an 
extra variable, not explicitly contained in the program, to fully specify the 
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program logic. For convenience I have used the next program line to be 
executed, nl. I could also have added an extra variable to the program to 
enable it to be mapped without this ambiguity. 
The CSA that corresponds to a program will in most cases be an 
incomplete description of the physical system, with the states and transitions 
of the program being a small subset of the possible transitions and states 
that the system is capable of. For example, a computer is typically capable 
of running many different programs, and so the CSA that corresponds to a 
particular program will not be a complete description of the states, substates 
and transitions of the computer. The CSA corresponding to a program also 
Figure 2. Extract from CSA1, which corresponds to program P1 (the full CSA has 
144 states). This collapses some of the transitions and omits the communications 
with the light sensor and motors. The states have been labelled for convenience with 
s1, s2 ... s16. Many transitions only depend on the current state; others are conditional 
on the state of the light sensor. The abbreviations of the program variables are 
as follows: ls=lightSensor; ols=oldLightSensor; m=motivation; lw=leftWheel; 
rw=rightWheel. nl was introduced to distinguish between identical states that 
make different transitions because they are at different points in the program (see 
discussion in text).
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does not specify how the transitions between states are causally effected 
by the physical system. This enables the CSA to be mapped onto many 
different physical systems, which are considered to implement it in different 
ways.
3.  Can CSA1 be identified in the Test System a way that is Consistent 
with R1 and R2?
Since the test system is a paradigmatic example of a computational system, 
we would expect it to contain a clearly defined set of computations that 
could easily be identified with Chalmers’ method. It also seems reasonable 
to expect that the CSA corresponding to the executing program could be 
unambiguously identified in the test system. After discussing the approach 
that I will use to analyze the test system in Section 3.1, I will highlight some 
of the problems that occur when we try to use Chalmers’ method to analyze 
the test system for computations in a way that would be consistent with an 
experiment on the correlates of consciousness.
3.1 Method for Identifying CSAs in the Test System
The programs that are executing on the test system can be identified by 
launching the Task Manager in Windows or by typing “ps –el” in a Linux 
shell. If P1 is on these lists, then P1 is running on the computer. Some 
people might think that if P1 is running on the computer, then CSA1 is being 
executed on the computer. However, the running of a program and the 
implementation of a CSA are different things – one is a list of instructions 
and data held in memory (combined with a record of the currently 
executing instruction); the other is a set of causal relationships between 
substates of a physical system. While the list of programs might provide an 
accurate picture of the CSAs that are executing in a computer, this cannot 
be assumed at the outset. Furthermore, this simple method for identifying 
CSAs is inapplicable to the brain, which does not have a convenient 
interface that displays the running programs. Since the test system is 
intended to help us understand how CSAs can be identified in the brain, it is 
pointless to analyze it using a method that is inapplicable to the brain. 
Instead, the CSAs in the test system will be identified by mapping what 
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Chalmers (2011, p. 328) calls the “distinct physical regions” of the system (if 
such distinct regions can be found) onto CSA substates. By observing how 
these regions change over time we can map out the state transitions and 
their conditional structure, which enables us to identify the CSAs that are 
executing in the system. This method for measuring CSAs is summarized as 
the following requirement: 
R3. In an experiment to test H2, the executing CSAs will be identified 
by mapping the distinct regions of  the physical system onto CSA 
substates. Measurements of  these distinct regions over time will be 
used to infer the structure of the CSAs. 
This method can be used to infer the brain’s CSAs from measurements of 
neuron voltages, blood flows, glia activity, and so on. The test system can 
be analyzed in a similar way by treating it as a physical object made of 
silicon, copper, plastic, etc., and mapping its distinct physical regions (for 
example, DRAM storage cells – see Section 3.3) onto CSA substates. While 
some facts about a computer’s operation will be used to illustrate the CSA 
mapping problems, the analysis should not depend on prior knowledge 
about the operating system or variable encoding, and the person doing the 
analysis will not be able to connect up a keyboard and screen to get the 
computer’s own ‘view’ of its internal states. 
3.2 Virtual Memory and Cache
If the test system is implementing CSA1, there should be distinct regions of 
the desktop computer that correspond to substates of CSA1¸ such that the 
patterns of causal interaction between these regions lead to the transitions 
specified in CSA1. Chalmers suggests that each substate could correspond 
to an independent element of the physical system, and so we might initially 
think that ls, ols, m, lw, rw and nl could be neatly mapped onto the areas of 
dynamic random access memory (DRAM) that hold the program variables 
lightSensor, oldLightSensor, motivation, leftWheel and rightWheel. The 
problem with this mapping is that the physical locations accessed by the 
CPU as it runs P1 will vary depending on whether virtual memory is used 
and whether the data has been copied into the CPU cache. Depending on 
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the cache algorithms and the amount of physical and virtual memory, the 
transitions between physical states in the desktop computer will have very 
little correspondence with CSA1, and they will vary substantially between 
different runs of the program as different chunks of memory are copied 
into cache, other programs are run on the computer and virtual memory is 
swapped on and off the hard drive.
It might be thought that we could solve this problem by mapping 
substates of CSA1 onto sets of physical states of the desktop computer. 
For example, we could map the substates onto tables listing the location 
of each variable at each point in time. However, these tables could only 
be constructed retrospectively, and they would vary with each run of the 
program because the use of cache and virtual memory depends on the other 
processes running on the system (a computer virus could suddenly use 
up a lot of memory, which would cause other processes to be swapped on 
and off the hard drive). This use of retrospective tables would completely 
undermine the mapping of physical states onto CSA substates, and it 
would also be vulnerable to the panpsychism of Putnam-style disjunctive 
mappings.
These problems linked to virtual memory and CPU caching are likely to 
defeat simple methods of interpreting the test system as an implementation 
of CSA1. The state transitions of the DRAM that holds the variables will 
vary with each run of the program and the CSAs corresponding to different 
programs will overlap in complex ways. In principle it might be possible 
to untangle the entire operating system and the algorithms of the low level 
chips in order to track a piece of information through the system. But 
this untangling process would not preserve the causal and counterfactual 
relationships between the elements of the physical system that correspond 
to CSA substates. This does not prove that a desktop computer running 
P1 is not implementing CSA1 because CSA1 might be buried somewhere 
in its physical states. But it does show that there is little or no connection 
between the programs that are running on a computer and the CSAs that it 
is implementing.
Since virtual memory and CPU caching are non-essential optimization 
strategies, they will be set aside for the rest of this paper and the test 
system will be revised so that P1 is running on the simple computer shown 
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in Figure 3. This does not have virtual memory or cache and it can be 
considered to be an implementation of a random access Turing machine.
3.3 Mapping Physical States onto CSA Substates
The most obvious ‘distinct physical regions’ of the simple computer are the 
DRAM storage cells. Since the person analyzing the simple computer does 
not have high level information about the operating system (for example, 
whether it is 32- or 64-bit)8 - there are no restrictions on how they should 
organize these cells into higher level groups. This leads to an extremely 
large number of equally valid ways of interpreting the simple computer’s 
DRAM storage cells as substates of a CSA.
The voltage in a DRAM storage cell typically ranges from 0 to 1.5 V 
and changes continuously with time (typically decreasing between refresh 
8 Roughly speaking, a 32-bit operating system uses a maximum of thirty two 1s 
and 0s to represent a number or a memory address. A 64-bit operating system uses 
up to sixty four 1s and 0s to represent a number or a memory address.
Figure 3. Simple computer. This computer uses dynamic random access memory 
(DRAM), whose storage cell voltages decay over time and have to be constantly 
refreshed. The values of 1 or 0 are obtained by applying a threshold to the storage 
cell voltages (see Section 3.3). The CPU uses device drivers to communicate with 
the light sensor and motor interface chips.
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cycles). To begin with I will consider the standard way of interpreting a 
DRAM voltage, which is to apply a threshold and interpret a voltage above 
the threshold as a ‘1’ and a voltage below the threshold as a ‘0’. To make the 
discussion clear, I will use a simpler example than the test system: a C++ 
program, P2, that calculates the Fibonacci series. At the end of each while 
loop the fib variable contains the next number in the sequence: 
unsigned char fib = 0;
unsigned char nM1 = 1;
unsigned char nM2 = 0;
while(true){ 
    fib = nM2 + nM1;
    nM2 = nM1;
    nM1 = fib;
}
When P2 is run on the simple computer we get the sequence of memory 
states shown in Figure 4a. If we interpret each DRAM storage cell as a CSA 
substate, we get the CSA shown in Figure 4b.
If we want to locate the CSA corresponding to P2 within the memory 
states, we will have to relax the requirement that distinct regions of the 
physical system are mapped onto CSA substates, and allow groups of 
DRAM cells to be mapped onto CSA substates.9 If the grouping of DRAM 
cells in Figure 4c is used, then we get the CSA illustrated in Figure 4d, 
which corresponds to the Fibonacci program. However, without the distinct 
regions requirement there are no limits to the ways in which we can 
interpret groupings of the DRAM storage cells as substates of a CSA. For 
example, the grouping of DRAM cells in Figure 4e leads to the CSA shown 
in Figure 4f.
All three CSAs in Figure 4 are equally valid mappings of physical states 
of the computer onto CSA substates, and the substates within each CSA 
9 This is because a DRAM cell only holds a single 1 or 0, whereas the P2 
variables are encoded using multiple 1s and 0s.
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are causally related to each other to the same extent. This is because the 
number of bits that are allocated to each number is not a ‘distinct region’ of 
the physical system, but a high level piece of information that is typically 
accessed through a graphical interface. There is no canonical way of 
mapping groups of DRAM cells onto CSA substates, and so when the 
simple computer is running P2 it is simultaneously implementing as many 
CSAs as there are ways of partitioning its DRAM. The only objective fact 
of the matter is that at least one interpretation of the DRAM matches the 
CSA of the program that is running. 
Figure 4. Different mappings of DRAM states onto CSA substates. a) A threshold 
is typically applied to the DRAM voltages: a voltage above the threshold is 
interpreted as a ‘1’; a voltage below the threshold is interpreted as a ‘0’. When this 
interpretation is applied to the DRAM of the simple computer as it runs P2 we get 
a sequence of states, which is shown for times t1-t4. Each time step corresponds 
to an iteration of the while loop. b) The CSA that results from the mapping of 
individual DRAM cells onto CSA substates. c) Mapping of variables from the 
Fibonacci program onto groupings of DRAM storage cells. d) CSA corresponding 
to this interpretation of the DRAM, which matches the Fibonacci program. e) An 
alternative interpretation of the DRAM that maps its states onto variables a, b, c, d 
and e. f) CSA corresponding to the alternative interpretation of the DRAM. 
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So far I have assumed that the voltages are mapped onto 1s and 0s in 
the standard way. However, an external observer who was attempting 
to analyze this system for CSAs would not be constrained to apply any 
particular threshold to this voltage, and the mapping between voltage 
values and substate values could be carried out in many different ways – 
for instance, 1.5 V can be interpreted as a substate value of 1, 100 or -0.75. 
The sampling frequency and the way in which the system is divided into 
discrete spatial areas also have major effects on the substate values.10 Some 
10 The application of an arbitrary voltage threshold could be avoided by mapping 
the DRAM voltages onto continuous substate values. This possibility is discussed 
by Chalmers (2011, p. 347-349). This would break the link between digital 
programs and the CSAs implemented by the physical computer and there would 
still be ambiguities about which parts or aspects of a physical system are measured 
to extract the analogue values (Gamez 2014).
Figure 5. The effect of voltage thresholding on substate values. It is assumed that 
the DRAM storage cell voltages range from 0-1.5 V. a) Voltages in the DRAM 
storage cells at a particular point in time; their value is given by colour scale on 
the right. b) Values of the substates interpreted using a threshold of 0.75 V, so 
that a voltage >= 0.75 maps to 1 and a voltage < 0.75 maps to 0. c) Values of the 
substates interpreted using a threshold of 0.5 V, so that a voltage >= 0.5 maps to 1 
and a voltage < 0.5 maps to 0. d) Voltage ranges are used to map the voltages onto 
numbers 0-5, resulting in a base 6 interpretation of the substate values.
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of these problems are illustrated in Figure 5.
While Chalmers acknowledges that a system can implement more than 
one computation, he claims that this is not a problem as long as it does not 
implement every computation. However, to prove that a CSA is correlated 
with consciousness we have to show that it is executing when the system 
is conscious and not executing when it is unconscious (R2). This means 
that we will have to search through the effectively infinite number of ways 
of mapping DRAM states onto CSA substates to prove that a candidate 
CSA is not present when the system is unconscious. This vast search space 
is purely the result of how we define the mapping rules linking states of 
the simple computer to substates of the CSA - it has nothing to do with 
complex mapping functions that change arbitrarily over time or Putnam-
style disjunctive mappings. With an infinity of parallel CSAs it is going to 
be impossible to prove H2 because we will not be able to demonstrate that a 
particular CSA is absent from the unconscious brain.
3.4 The Causal Structure of a Computer
Suppose that we ignore the problems raised in the previous section and map 
the substates of CSA1 onto the areas of the simple computer’s DRAM that 
actually hold the program variables, using standard bit allocation methods 
and voltage thresholding. Although the substates and state transitions of the 
simple computer will now follow the substates and state transitions of CSA1, 
the causal topology specified in CSA1 will not match the causal topology of 
the mapped system because the mapped DRAM areas are causally isolated 
from each other. Left to themselves these are incapable of producing a 
single state transition - at most the storage cell voltages will decay over time 
without the constant refresh required to maintain their states (see Figure 
6a).
The state transitions in the simple computer depend on complex causal 
interactions between the DRAM voltages and a large number of substates 
in the CPU and the rest of the system (Figure 6b).11 These electromagnetic 
11 The operations and instructions that are carried out by a CPU (AND, OR, 
etc.) are high level descriptions of the physical circuits, whose electromagnetic 
interactions cause the state transitions. 
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interactions between voltages in different parts of the chips are governed 
by complex laws, and the number, type and behaviour of the additional 
substates varies with the architecture of the computer. Since these 
additional substates are not specified in CSA1, the DRAM areas holding 
the P1 program variables will not be implementing CSA1, but a completely 
different causal topology, which is required to make the program actually 
work.
This breaks the link between the program that is running on a computer 
and the CSAs that are present in the physical states of a computer. While it 
is possible that CSA1 can be found somewhere inside the simple computer 
when it is running P1, it is equally likely that CSA1 will be executed when 
the simple computer is running a completely different program. The 
fact that a computer is running P1 is not evidence for the claim that it is 
Figure 6. a) The simple computer’s DRAM is mapped onto CSA1 substates. These 
memory storage cell areas have no causal interactions with each other, and so they 
cannot bring about the CSA1 state transitions by themselves. Without the voltage 
refresh they will rapidly decay to zero. b) In the simple computer a large number 
of other substates (mostly chip voltages) are required to causally facilitate the state 
transitions. These substates are not included in CSA1, and they will vary widely 
with the architecture of the computer. 
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implementing CSA1. 
3.5 Counterfactuals
A real physical system is subject to influences from its environment that 
cause state transitions. While great care is taken to isolate computers’ 
electronic components, they are still subject to external interference, 
which can cause them to make state transitions that are not specified in 
the program. A computer executing P1 will therefore have a much richer 
set of connections between its states than is specified by CSA1, which are 
mediated by unlikely but possible events. For example, if there is a nuclear 
test within a certain distance of the simple computer with a particular 
electromagnetic pulse size and intensity etc., then the simple computer will 
transition from s1 to s3. Some examples of these state transitions are given 
in Figure 7b.
The causal topology of a physical system at a particular point in time 
includes all of the possible state transitions that could be caused internally 
or in response to external events. While most events in the universe will 
not affect the state transitions of the simple computer, it seems reasonable 
to assume that there are enough possible effects of the environment on the 
fragile DRAM voltages that could link each state with every other state 
of the system. This complete connectivity between the states of the simple 
computer running P1 is illustrated in Figure 7c. 
When a computer’s state transitions do not follow the program or 
operating system, we typically say that the program or computer has 
crashed or failed. However, the analysis described in this paper is solely 
based on an examination of a system’s states (R3), and in this context there 
is no crashing or failing – just state transitions that are or are not conditional 
on external events. All of a system’s possible state transitions count for its 
implementation of a CSA – any implications that these might have for the 
user’s interaction with the computer are irrelevant.
This problem with a CSA-based approach to implementation has been 
considered by Chalmers (2012), who suggests that some form of normal 
background conditions might have to be included: “... the definition might 
require that there be a mapping M and conditions C [that currently obtain] 
such that for every formal state-transition rule S1 → S 2, if conditions C 
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obtain and the system is in a total physical state that M maps to S1, it 
transits to a total physical state that M maps to S2.” (p. 235). For example, 
although the simple computer running P1 is in fact counterfactually and 
reliably sensitive to solar flares with particular parameters, the connection 
from s2 to s13 can be ruled out because this is a low or zero probability 
Figure 7. a) Extract from CSA1. b) Some of the counterfactual state transitions that 
are implemented by the simple computer when it is running P1. c) CSA describing 
the actual connections between s1, s2, s3, s12 and s13, which are conditional on 
unlikely but possible events, such as power failure or electromagnetic interference. 
d) The extract from CSA1 (part ‘a’ of this figure, with the connections shown in red) 
can be identified within the fully connected CSA (part ‘c’ of this figure).
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event under normal conditions. One difficulty with this response is that 
normal background conditions would presumably have to be specified 
using an arbitrary probability threshold, which excludes abnormal events. 
This would violate R1 because the threshold would be set by the person 
carrying out the experiment, and different experimenters could use different 
thresholds. A second problem is that the normal conditions requirement 
makes the computations that are executing in a particular system dependent 
on events elsewhere in the universe that alter the probability of events, but 
might never interact with the system. At one point in time the probability 
of solar flares might be below the arbitrary threshold, there would be no 
connection between s2 and s13 and the simple computer running P1 would 
be judged to be implementing CSA1. At a later time, events inside the sun 
might make solar flares more likely and the system will cease to implement 
CSA1, even if no solar flares with the appropriate parameters have in fact 
occurred. If normal background conditions have to be included in an 
account of implementation, the probability of every event in the universe 
that could possibly affect a system will have to be taken into account to 
establish whether it is conscious or not.
If a plausible account of normal background conditions cannot be 
developed, then the only CSAs that are actually implemented by human-
scale physical systems, such as brains and computers, are ones that have 
complete connectivity between their states. Human-scale physical systems 
cannot be completely isolated from low probability events, such as electrical 
interference or solar flares, that counterfactually link each state of a CSA to 
every other state. As systems get larger, the external factors that could cause 
state transitions will decrease, and the universe as a whole does not have 
a completely connected state structure because there is no possibility of 
outside interference. 
It might still be claimed that a system is implementing CSA1 because 
CSA1 is part of the completely connected CSA (see Figure 7d). This 
is correct, but in this case CSA1 cannot be a correlate of consciousness 
because the brain will have a completely connected CSA regardless of 
whether it is conscious or unconscious. Any CSA that can be found in the 
completely connected states of the conscious brain will also be present in 
the completely connected states of the unconscious brain.
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3.6 Overlapping CSAs
Consider a simplified ‘brain’ (SB) that consists of four biological neurons, 
each of which can be in two states, firing or not firing. The complete state 
space has 16 different states, s1 – s16, with s1 corresponding to state [0,0,0,0], 
s2 corresponding to state [0,0,0,1], and so on (the exact mapping of substates 
Figure 8. a) CSA describing complete state space of SB’s four neurons. Although 
each state only has a single label, this is a CSA, not a FSA, because the states are 
constituted by the substates of four neurons. b) States that are active whenever SB 
is conscious. c) Over the time period t1-t5 SB moves through states s3, s6, s9, s10 and 
s14. It is conscious from t2-t4. d) The grey areas are examples of the large number of 
overlapping CSAs that can be considered to be executing when the system enters 
state s6.
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to labels is not important). Figure 8a shows an illustrative CSA for the SB in 
which the conditional branches can be thought to depend on a combination 
of input and internal dynamics. Let us suppose that states s6, s9, s10 and s11 
are found to occur when SB is conscious, and that these states never occur 
when SB is unconscious (Figure 8b). During a particular execution run SB 
enters states s3, s6, s9, s10 and s14. It becomes conscious when it enters s6 and 
ceases to be conscious when it enters state s14 (Figure 8c).
Suppose that SB enters state s6. If we are looking for correlations 
between consciousness and CSAs, then we need to identify the CSAs that 
are executing at this point in time. Presumably the system is executing 
its complete CSA when it enters s6, and it can also be considered to be 
executing any and all of the possible subsets of the state space (sub-CSAs) 
that include s6 (examples are given in Figure 8d). It would violate R1 if we 
arbitrarily selected one of these overlapping CSAs and claimed that it was 
the only CSA that was executing. SB must therefore be considered to be 
executing a set of CSAs when it enters s6, which suggests that we can only 
hope to identify correlations between sets of CSAs and consciousness.
It might be objected that in this example states s6, s9, s10 and s11 are 
correlated with consciousness, and so these states must form the sub-CSA, 
shown in Figure 8b, whose execution is correlated with consciousness. 
While there might be no fact of the matter about which sub-CSA is being 
executed when the system enters a particular state, Ockham’s razor could be 
invoked to support the assumption that the sub-CSA consisting of states s6, 
s9, s10 and s11 is correlated with consciousness, even if only some of its states 
are entered during an execution run. According to this hypothesis, during 
the execution run shown in Figure 8c, the system would start off executing 
a sub-CSA that was not correlated with consciousness (for instance, one 
involving s1, s2, s3 and s4) or there would be no fact of the matter about 
which sub-CSA out of the overlapping sub-CSAs was being executed. At 
time t2 it would start executing the sub-CSA associated with consciousness 
until at t5 it would start executing a different sub-CSA not associated with 
consciousness, or there would cease to be a fact of the matter about which 
sub-CSA was being executed.
The problem with this claim is that a person who was monitoring the 
physical system would have no reason to believe that a particular sub-
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CSA was being executed or that there was a transition between active 
sub-CSAs. Nothing in the physical system corresponds to this change - 
someone who only knew the physical facts could not identify or predict 
it. It is only because there is a change in the consciousness associated with 
the system that we are inclined to say that one sub-CSA is being executed 
instead of another. This suggests that a change in the executing sub-CSA is 
not a measureable property of the physical system, but is being attributed 
to the system to support a particular theory – namely that executing CSAs 
are linked to conscious states. A correlate of consciousness is a property 
of the physical system that is correlated with the presence of conscious 
states – we measure the physical system, measure consciousness and look 
for correlations between the two. Consciousness cannot be used to identify 
features of the physical system that are supposed to be correlated with 
consciousness – an independent measure of a physical property is required. 
The state and the set of CSAs that overlap a state might be considered to be 
objective facts about a system (if one could address the other problems with 
CSAs that have been raised in this paper). It is not a fact that a single CSA 
is being executed to the exclusion of all the other CSAs that overlap the 
current state.
In systems with more than a few elements an extremely large number 
of CSAs will overlap each state. This number increases factorially with 
the size of the system, which will rapidly make it impractical to record the 
CSAs that are correlated with consciousness. A second issue is that any 
small change to the system’s state space will alter some of the CSAs that 
overlap a particular state. So even if was possible to exhaustively list the 
CSAs that were correlated with consciousness in one system, this list would 
become obsolete once the system changed its state space, which happens 
all the time in the brain. It would also be difficult or impossible to use the 
sets of CSAs that are correlated with consciousness in one system to make 
predictions about consciousness in other systems.
Given these problems it is more plausible and experimentally tractable 
to focus on correlations between particular states of a system and 
consciousness. In SB it is far simpler to enumerate the states that are 
correlated with consciousness (s6, s9, s10 and s11) than to list the large 
number of CSAs that overlap these states. System states are more robust 
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correlates that can be preserved across modifications of the state space, and 
it is more likely that two conscious organisms will have common states, 
rather than common sets of CSAs.
3.7 Patterns of Causation 
Chalmers’ account of implementation relies on causation to avoid problems 
with panpsychism and trivial implementations: 
While programs themselves are syntactic objects, implementations are 
not: they are real physical systems with complex causal organization, 
with real physical causation going on inside. In an electronic computer, 
for instance, circuits and voltages push each other around in a manner 
analogous to that in which neurons and activations push each other 
around. It is precisely in virtue of this causation that implementations 
may have cognitive and therefore semantic properties. (Chalmers 2011, 
p. 344) 
If the target system matches the causal topology specified by the CSA, then 
it is supposed to instantiate the organizationally invariant properties that are 
associated with this causal topology, such as the property of having a mind 
and potentially consciousness. However, a major problem with Chalmers’ 
use of causation is that it is far too weak and vague. This makes it easy 
to claim that one system has the same causal topology as another and is 
therefore implementing the same computation. If Chalmers’ account of 
implementation is going to become a scientific hypothesis, the nature of a 
causal relationship has to be spelled out in enough detail to enable it to be 
accurately measured in a physical system.
Chalmers’ vague handling of causation is linked to his use of CSAs 
to specify causal topologies: “...the CSA formalism provides a perfect 
formalization of the notion of causal topology. A CSA description specifies a 
division of a system into parts, a space of states for each part, and a pattern 
of interaction between these states This is precisely what is constitutive 
of causal topology.” (Chalmers 2011, p. 341). While a CSA does specify a 
division of a system into parts and a space of states for each part, it does 
not specify the pattern of interaction between the parts that lead to the state 
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transitions – it merely records the brute fact that the parts or substates of 
the system have one set of values at one time and at an arbitrary amount 
of time later the substates have a different set of values. This makes it 
highly questionable whether the CSA formalism provides any account of 
causal topology at all. A specification of the amount and pattern of causal 
relationships between the parts of a system would need to be added to the 
CSA formalism to enable it to describe a causal topology.
Within the literature on causation, there is a useful distinction between 
a conceptual analysis of causation, which elucidates how we understand 
and use causal concepts in our everyday speech, and an empirical account 
of causation, which attempts to explain how causation actually operates in 
the physical world (Dowe 2000). Predominantly conceptual accounts of 
causation include Lewis’ counterfactual analysis (Lewis 1973) and Mackie’s 
INUS conditions (Mackie 1993). The most developed empirical account of 
causation has been set out by Dowe (2000), who defines a causal interaction 
as follows:
•  A conserved quantity is a quantity governed by a conservation law, 
such as mass-energy, momentum or charge.
•  A causal process is a world line of an object that possesses a 
conserved quantity.
•  A causal interaction is an intersection of world lines that involves the 
exchange of a conserved quantity.
While conceptual accounts of causation are unlikely to lead to an agreed 
fact of the matter about the causal topology that is implemented by a 
particular physical system (R1), empirical accounts do enable causal 
topologies to be precisely specified. They also support the identification 
of supervenient causal relationships at different levels of a system - for 
example, an empirical account of causation can easily deal with the fact 
that causal relationships between neuron voltages supervene on ions 
moving across a cell membrane. This suggests that Dowe’s approach 
could be used to provide a detailed specification of the amount and type 
of causal interactions in a system - defining substates as causal processes 
and linking state transitions to the exchange of conserved quantities, such 
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as mass-energy or momentum. While this would go a long way towards 
tightening up Chalmers’ account of implementation, it would also virtually 
eliminate the idea that one system can implement the causal topology 
of another. Systems with different architectures and materials have very 
different patterns of exchange of conserved quantities. A modern digital 
computer, the ENIAC and Babbage’s Analytical Engine that are running 
the same program will not be implementing the same computations, if this 
more causally accurate theory of implementation is used to identify the 
computations. All of the generality of Chalmers’ account will have been 
lost.
4. Discussion and Conclusions
This paper has asked whether the execution of a computation could be 
a sole member of a CC set (H1). In other words, could the execution 
of a computation be correlated with consciousness independently of 
the architecture of the system or the material in which it is executing? 
I have suggested that this question could be addressed experimentally 
by identifying the computations that are executing in the conscious and 
unconscious brain. This requires a way of measuring computations in 
the brain and Chalmers’ CSA approach was selected as the best method 
that is currently available for this purpose. H1 was then rephrased as the 
question about whether a CSA could be a sole member of a CC set (H2). To 
answer this question I investigated whether CSAs could be unambiguously 
identified in a computer in a way that would be consistent with an 
experiment on the correlates of consciousness (R1-R3). The following 
problems were identified:
1.  Virtual memory and cache (Section 3.2) and the causal structure of a 
computer (Section 3.4) break the link between the programs running 
in a computer and the CSAs that are present. There is little or no 
relationship between the running programs and the CSAs that are 
being executed.
2.  There are an effectively infinite number of different ways in 
which a physical system can be divided into parts that are mapped 
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onto CSA substates (Section 3.3). This will make it impossible to 
experimentally prove that a CSA which is present in the conscious 
brain is not present in the unconscious brain (R2). 
3.  Low probability counterfactuals link all states of a human-scale 
physical system, leading to complete connectivity of the CSA 
describing a system’s states (Section 3.5). This suggests that CSAs 
cannot be correlated with consciousness because there will be 
identical CSAs in the conscious and unconscious brain. 
4.  When a system enters a particular state it is executing all of the 
CSAs that include this state (Section 3.6) - it is not possible to pick 
out a single CSA and claim that a system is executing this CSA 
to the exclusion of all others. This means that we can only look 
for correlations between sets of CSAs and consciousness. Such 
correlations will be impossible to specify on larger systems and they 
will not generalize easily.
5.  When Chalmers’ vague notion of causation is cashed out in a 
physically plausible way using an empirically grounded theory, it 
becomes much less likely that different computers running the same 
program will have the same causal topology (Section 3.7).
These problems have been illustrated on some simple systems and they 
will be many orders of magnitude harder on the brain, which has vague 
‘distinct physical regions’ and an extremely large state space that changes 
all the time. The issues can be separated into theoretical problems (points 3 
and 5) and pragmatic difficulties (points 2 and 4). The theoretical problems 
suggest that CSAs cannot be used to identify computational correlates of 
consciousness in the brain, even in principle. If the theoretical problems 
could somehow be addressed, the pragmatic difficulties are likely to prevent 
us from ever using CSAs to test H1.
The most obvious way of addressing these problems would be to 
develop a better account of implementation. Chalmers’ theory was not 
designed for experimental work on the correlates of consciousness, and 
so it is not surprising that it is does not perform well in this context. Some 
of the difficulties with the CSA approach are linked to its abstractness 
and generality, and so it might be possible to fix it by specifying causal 
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topologies in more detail. However, if the CSA account is supplemented 
with more details about the patterns of exchange of physically conserved 
quantities, then it will become a description of a physical correlate of 
consciousness, because it is unlikely that a detailed pattern of exchanges 
could implemented in different physical systems. It might be thought that 
the problems of complete connectivity highlighted in Section 3.5 could be 
fixed by specifying probabilities for each state transition. However, this 
is unlikely to work in the brain where the state transitions change all the 
time as the brain learns and shifts between tasks. There does not appear to 
be an easy way of adding detail to the CSA account that could address the 
problems that have been identified. 
A second way of  tackling these problems would be to def ine 
computations in terms of their inputs and outputs. For example, an adding 
function is defined by the fact that it returns the sum of a set of numbers – 
the details of its implementation do not matter and it would be superfluous 
to specify it using a CSA. The problem with this approach is that we often 
exhibit very little external behaviour when we are conscious – for instance, 
when I sit quietly in an armchair with my eyes closed there is no obvious 
external behaviour that could be used to identify computations that could 
be correlated with my consciousness. We might divide the brain up into 
modules and attempt to specify the computations that are carried out by 
each module by using their input-output relationships. But many of the 
computations linked to consciousness are likely to be impossible to partition 
in this way. Some functions that might be correlated with consciousness 
are implemented by highly modular brain areas – for example, V5 is linked 
to our visual experience of motion. But others, such as a global workspace 
(Baars 1988), are likely to be dynamically implemented through coordinated 
interactions between many areas of the brain. Since there are an infinite 
number of ways of dividing up the brain into modules, it is going be very 
difficult to develop a workable method for defining computations based on 
the external behaviour of brain areas.
It might be claimed that CSA1 does not fully capture the computations 
in P1 because it does not explicitly include the logical operations that are 
specified at a high level in the program using ‘if’, ‘else’, ‘while’, etc., which 
are mapped down to more basic computational operations by a compiler. 
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To address this concern, a much larger CSA could be constructed that 
specifies the causal topology that actually occurs in the CPU and memory 
of the simple computer as it runs P1, which would include the causal 
structure of the implementation of the low level computational operations. 
Let us suppose that we do this and produce CSA2, which describes the 
causal topology of the simple computer’s chips at the nanometre scale as 
it runs P1. In this case, it could more plausibly be claimed that the simple 
computer is implementing CSA2 when it runs P1, and that any other system 
that implements CSA2 will implement the same computations as the simple 
computer running P1. The problem with this response is that CSA2 is 
specific to one particular type of computer. It will not be implemented by 
computers that use different chips to implement their logical operations or 
by programmable computers with completely different architectures, such 
as Babbage’s Analytical Engine. In the very best case, this approach could 
show that identical computers running identical programs are implementing 
the same computations. However, it would remove one of the key 
attractions of CSAs, which were supposed to be general enough to identify 
the same computations in different systems. Furthermore, if CSAs have to 
be specified at this level of detail, then there will be little or no resemblance 
between the CSAs that are implemented by brains and computers. This 
would suggest that brains are not executing computations, or it could be 
interpreted to show that CSAs cannot be used to identify computational 
correlates of consciousness in the brain.
The disconnect between a computer’s running programs and the CSAs 
that it is implementing has implications for the suggestion that we might 
eventually be able to upload our brain onto a computer or replace part 
of our brain with a functionally equivalent chip (Moor 1988; Chalmers 
1995; Kurzweil 1999; Chalmers 2010). Suppose we manage to identify a 
CSA in the brain that is correlated with consciousness, write a program 
that implements this CSA, and run it on a computer. The arguments in 
sections 3.2 and 3.4 suggest that this system is unlikely to have the same 
consciousness as the original brain because the CSAs that are present in the 
computer are unlikely to correspond to the CSAs of the running programs. 
A computer running a program that simulates my brain is unlikely to be 
implementing the CSAs that are present in my brain. A chip that replicates 
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the input-output functionality of part of my brain (for example, a silicon 
hippocampus) is unlikely to be implementing the CSAs of the original 
brain area. It might be possible to design a different type of ‘computer’ to 
implement CSAs, but this would require a very different architecture from 
a standard computer. For example, neuromorphic chips (Indiveri et al. 2011) 
that use the flow of electrons in silicon circuits to model the flow of ions 
in neurons might be capable of implementing some of the CSAs that are 
present in biological neurons.
Many of the issues with experiments on the computational correlates 
of consciousness will be encountered by experiments on the functional 
correlates of consciousness. To prove that there are functional correlates 
of consciousness we need to measure the functions that are executing in 
the brain, so we can show that certain functions are only present when the 
brain is conscious. The problems identified in this paper suggest that CSAs 
will not be a workable method for specifying and identifying functions, and 
it is not obvious how else one could measure functions during this type of 
experiment.
The theoretical and pragmatic problems raised in Section 3 suggest 
that H2 cannot be experimentally tested. While H2 might be a valid 
philosophical or metaphysical theory about the world, if it cannot be 
falsified, it is not a scientific hypothesis (Popper 2002). H1 cannot be tested 
until a plausible method for measuring computations has been found. Many 
of the problems with Chalmers’ approach are likely to be encountered by 
other methods of measuring computations, but it will not necessarily be 
impossible to develop a method that can circumvent these difficulties and 
meet the requirements of an experiment on the correlates of consciousness 
(R1-R3). Until such a method has been found, we are likely to make more 
progress by focusing on patterns in particular physical structures that could 
be correlated with consciousness.12 
12 It might be possible to use CSAs to describe the behaviour of one part or aspect 
of a physical system. This would not be a computational correlate of consciousness 
in the sense of H1 because claims about consciousness based on this physical 
correlate could not be extended to other systems that exhibited the same CSA in a 
different substrate. There was not space in this paper to explore this application of 
CSAs in more detail.
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